Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1950

Uintah Freight Lines and Eastern Utah
Transportation Co v. Public Service Commission of
Utah and Ashton's, Inc. : Brief of Respondents
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
L. C. Montgomery; Skeen, Thurman & Worsley; Attorneys for Defendant; Clinton D. Vernon;
Quention L. R. Alston; Attorneys for Defendant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Uintah Freight Lines v. Public Service Comm. Of Utah, No. 7429 (Utah Supreme Court, 1950).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1241

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

.

l'•.
I

IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH

..

\ ·.~

UINTAH FREIGHT LINES and
EASTERN UTAH TRANSPORTATION COMPANY,
Plaintiffs (Appellants),

'

1

';"·

''f·!
~-~

.

.'

~,

~!it.
l

vs.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
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SKEEN, THURMAN &
WORSLEY,
Attorneys for Defendant
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Ashton's, Incorporated.
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Attorney General,
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QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Defendant
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

UIXTAH FREIGHT LIXES and
EASTERN UTAH TRANSPOR-

\

\

T~\TION CO~IP.A_NY,

Pla-intiffs (Appellants), ·

vs.

\ CAsE

No. 7429

PUBLIC SERVICE COlVIlVIISSION
OF UTAH, and ASHTON'S,
I~ CORPORA TED,
Defendants (Respondents).

J

DEFENDANTS' (RESPONDENTS'). BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The opposition (appellants), in their brief, have
designated themselves as "plaintiffs", and the Public
Service Commission and Ashton'.s Inc. (respondents),
as ''defendants.'' In order to avoid confusion, respondents, in their brief, will use the same designations.
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Plaintiffs' statement of facts, except for a few
inaccuracies and inadequacies, is substantially correct
rand sufficient for a review of the action of the Public
Service Commission of Utah in granting defendant,
Ashton's, Incorporated, a corporation, a contract motor
carrier permit, against the protest of the two named
plaintiffs in this proceeding.
At the outset of their brief, plaintiffs state that
they obtained :a writ of certiorari to review the action
of the Public Service Commission in granting the contract motor carrier ~permit involved herein, over the
objections of plaintiffs and others. But the writ, it will
be noted, was applied for by and in behalf of, and was
granted to, the Uintah Freight Lines and Eastern Utah
Tr:a,nsportation Company only. None of the other protestants joined in, or was a party to, plaintiffs' petition,
or was included in the writ granted plaintiffs by this
court. ( R. 119-121 ; 122.) Hence, any reference to the
oth'er protestants, including Ashworth Transfer Conlpany, a partnership, and Salt Lake Transfer Comp.any,
a p~artnership (who, at one stage of the instant proceedings, objected to the granting of the application involved
herein, were also protestants), or to the stipulation
entered into that those two partnerships were (to quote
from page 4 of plaintiffs' brief) "common carriers with
operating authority and adequate equipment at all times
to transport required commodities, including cement,
between Devil 's Slide and Heber City, Roosevelt, and
Vernal, Utah,'' is wholly i:m:ma terial to the issue now
before this Court. Neither they nor 'any other protest-
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ants, except only Uintah Freight Lines and Eastern
Utah Transportation Comp'any, now complain of the
granting of the contract Inotor carrier permit under
consideration.
On pa_ge 5 of their brief, counsel, presu1nably with
the intention of sho~ing gener!ally the nature and scope
of the mercantile interests of the Ashton family in Heber
City and the Uintah Basin, quote 'part of one paragraph
(without indicating its incompleteness) and the 'vhole
of another paragraph of the findings of the Public
Service Commission herein. ( R. 105.) The language
quoted, how·ever, is too limited to adequately reflect the
full nature and scope of the Ashton interests and their
methods of transporting merchandise into eastern Utah,
and particularly the Uintah Basin, one of the largest
areas located in any of the western states not served
by rail. Accordingly, for the convenience of all concerned, we again quote from the Commission's findings
the whole of the language quoted by the op~position
(which language we italicize), and also the language
immediately preceding, as far back as the last par~graph
on page 103 ( Co1r1mission 's Findings, R. 103-105) :
"That the said Mrs. Leslie Ashton is the surviving wife of Leslie Ashton, deceased, and that
she and said deceased are the mother 'and father,
respectively, of the said Clarence L. Ashton, Rae
Ashton and Lowe Ashton; that in about the
year 1898, said deceased as an individual, established a mercantile business in Vern al, Utah, and
continued to operate said business, as an individual or as a partnership with one or more of
1
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his said sons, until the time of deceased's death
in about the year 1930, and, in said operations,
said deceased and his said sons also established
mercantile stores in Roosevelt and Heber City, and
a gasoline service station in Vernal, Utah; that
between the time of the death of said deceased,
in about the year 1930, and the year 1943, said
mercantile stores and said gasoline service station were owned and operated by said three
sons and the said Mrs. Leslie Ashton, as partnerships or as corporations; that in the- year 1943
said joint holdings were partitioned between S!aid
individuals, said mercantile store in Vernal being
taken over by the said Rae Ashton, said gasoline
service station in Vernal, by said individuals,
in equal shares, Said mercantile store in Roosevelt, by the said Clarence L. Ashton, and said
mercantile store in Heber City, by the said
Lowe Ashton. That no carrier service was available during all the period of the early growth
and development of these enterprises.
·
'' Th!a.t at all times since the establishment of
said mercantile business in Vernal, Utah, by
the said Leslie Ashton, in about the year 1898,
and the subsequent establishment of the mercantile stores in Roosevelt and Heber City, and the
· :gasoline service station in Vernal, Utah, by said
dece a.sed and members of his immediate family,
said deceased or one or more of his said three
sons, as individuals, or as p.artnerships, or as
corporations, by means of a team and wagon,
or by motor vehicle, have hauled, and a.pplicant
is now hauling, from points outside of the Uintah
Basin and· Heber City to Heber City, Roosevelt
and Vernal, Utah~ practically the whole of the
merchandise· and commodities sold and handled
· at s aid Ashton mercantile stores, located at Heber
City, ·Roosevelt and Vernal, Utah, and at said
1

1

1

1
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gasoline service station located at Vernal, Utah,
and that none of the protestants in this case h as
ever hauled, ·or is now hauling, any of said
n1erchandise or con1modi ties, . except in very
small and ·minor quantities. That the business
·practices and success of the various Ashton enterprises have been est'ablished under this method.
That applica~~t _proposes to perform said con.tract motor carrier service in substantially· the
san~e manner and to the sa,me extent, and for
the same interested p;arties located in Roosevelt
amd Vernal, as said service has been pe·rformed,
and is now being performed, by applicant and
other members of the Ashton family, as individuals, or as partnerships or corporations wholly
·owned by members of said family, during the
past fifty year$. That -even now, :despite the various corporate interests, these Ashton mercantile
· stores are operated_ more or less as one large
enterp,rise -purchase jointly, advertise jointly,
and ship by railroad and motor vehicle jointly.
''That there is no evidence of willfu-l intent
to violate the law during the many years that
Leslie Ashton, deceased, or one or more of his
said three sons, as individuals, or as partnership-s,
or as corporations, have transported merchandise
from Salt Lake City to Heber City, Roosevelt and
Vernal, Utah, serving the Ashton mercantile
stores and gasoline service station, located in
said cities, and the commission has treated the
operations as private hauls.''
1

ARGUMENT
The three points relied upon by rp.Iaintiffs as error,
will be discussed in the order in which they are considered in plain tiffs' brief. (Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 8.)
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POINT I.
ALL THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THE ADEQUACY

ANP REASONABLENESS OF EXISTING SERVICE.

As stated by plaintiffs (p. 6, their brief), the Commission, in its report herein, found (R. 108):
"that existing transportation facilities do not
provide adequate or rea~onable service to meet
the requirements of the three shippers (Leslie
Ashton & Sons in Roosevelt, Utah, Ashton Oil
& Gas Company and Ashton- Brothers Company
in Vernal, Ut,ah) for which applicant proposes
to serve as a con tract carrier,''
and, presumably, supported such general finding by
the three specific findings quoted on pages 6, 7 and 8 of
plaintiffs' brief, and found in the Record herein· at
pages 106 :and 107.
It is interesting to note that 'Plaintiffs did not
attack, or make any complaint whatsoever against, the
three specific findings made by the Commission; nor
did they point to a single word or line of the three
specific findings as not being supported by the evidence
introduced at the hearing before the Commission. Plaintiffs contented themselves with bre:aking ,up Point I
into three categories, identifying them as _(a), (b) and
(c), and considering them sep~arately, each category
with extreme brevity. We earnestly assert that within
the first two of the three findings, quoted in plaintiffs'
brief, sufficient facts are found, affirmatively estabSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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lishing that the service rendered and made available
by plaintiffs to the three shippers (\Yhich service did
not include the hauling of ceinent from Devil's Slide
to Roosevelt and 'Ternal) 'vas not reasonably 'adequate
to meet the shippers' requirements. It '\vould indeed
have been an easy matter for ·p.Iaintiffs to have pointed
out any finding not supported by the evidence, had
there been no evidence to support such finding.
For the convenience of the Court, we quote the
first two of the three findings in question, omitting the
third finding which deals wholly '\vith the hauling of
cement from Devil's Slide, a point not served by either
of the two plaintiffs and not an issue in this p·roceeding:
"That applicant, in the conduct of its general
hard"'""are store and lumber yard at Heber City,
maintains a warehouse, and keeps. on hand therein quantities of hardware, and cement, lumber
and other building materials, sufficient to meet
its own needs, and the eme_rgency demands made
by customers upon said three shippers, located
at Roosevelt and Vernal; that said emergency
demands frequently arise and are phoned in to
applicant by said shippers, and that 'ap:plicant
is able to and does transport to said Roosevelt
and Vernal, within a matter of three to four
hours, the merchandise necessary to meet said
emergency demands.
''That said two Ashton mercantile shippers,
located at Roosevelt and Vernal, sell large quantities of fresh meats, fruits and vegetables, which
are highly perishable; that applicant, in the
transportation of said commodities from S:alt
Lake City to Roosevelt and Vernal, has made,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and is now _ making, three trips weekly, leaving
Salt Lake City in mid afternoon, and arriving
in Heber City in the early evening, 1and in Roosevelt and Vernal at a·pproximately 8 and 9 o'clock
P.M., respectively, on the same day; that upon
arriving at destination, applicant unloads said
merchandise and places the same after business
~ours, in refrigerators and coolers located in
the stores of said two Ashton mercantile shippers,
and- that by such means said merchandise is ade~
quately preserved and can be made ready for
display :and sale at ·the time of the opening of
the stores on the following morning. This prac~
tice has continued for a long period, and the
business methods of the parties have been built
upon this system.''
(a)

In the first category considered, identified as (a),
it is asserted that no authority was needed from the
Public Service Commission for applicant to haul hardware, cement, lumber and other materials to Roosevelt
and Vernal, Utah, from applicant's yard at Heber City,
and this for the reason that when making such hauls,
applicant was moving its own merchandise. That very
issue, plaintiffs state on ·page 11 of their brief, was
argued by their counsel during the progress of the
he:aring. They quoted the following language of counsel, found in the Record at page 629:

-·.'' * * * If Ashton's, Inc., as witness is testify- ing (referring to testimony of C. L. Ashton) is
a distributor of merchandise and is distributing
its· own merchandise that it buys and pays for,
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there is no need of this application. He would
be carrying his o'Yn goods over the highway.''
The above quoted argun1ent of counsel, appearing
in plaintiffs' cross-exan1ination of C. L. Ashton, the
principal owner of the C<?rporate stock of the shipper
at Roosevelt, Utah, and relating to an objection made
by applicant to plaintiffs' asking the witness to whom
he 'vould look for payment if loss occurred to merchandise 'Yhile being hauled en route from Heber City
to Roosevelt, is followed by an attempt on the part of
plaintiffs to interpret the testimony of that witness.
In Inaking such attempt, .they state, again on page 11
of their brief :
'' A:nd immediately thereafter that witness
(C. L. Ashton) testified that in the event of
loss in transit he would expect Ashton's, Inc.,
to pay for the material because it wouldn't be
his (C. L .. Ashton's) material yet.''
An examination of the whole of the R.~cord, as
made during the cross-examination of C. L. Ashton,
permits of no such interpretation. Rather than give
our own vie,Ys as to what the witness said ·or' meant,
we quote at some length from the Record, b~ginning on
p~e 629, and immediately following the above quoted
argument of plaintiffs' counsel:

''MR. THURMAN (Counsel for applicant):
''And it is very obvious, and positively testified to in this case that Ashton's, Inc. is a mercantile institution, and it also seeks an ap.plication to haul as a contract carrier. It may do both
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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if this application is granted. It may sell its own
merchandise, retail or wholesale or in any way it
sees fit. And it may also, if this application is
granted, of course, haul for other shippers.''
''COM. HACKING·:
''The objection will be overruled. Do you recall the question, Mr. Ashton~"
"THE WITNESS:
"About who would pay for the freight 1"
''MR. RICHARDS:
''No:"
''COM. HACKING:
' 'In the event of the fire. ''
"THE WITNESS:
"Yes."
"A. I would expect Ashton's, Inc. to pay for
it, - they are hauling it.''
"BY MR. RICHARDS (Counsel for plaintiffs) :

"Q. That is, it would be- Well, let's put it
this way: Thiat is, you would not expect to pay
for it 1"
"A.

No."

'' Q. Y.ou didn't get it, did you 1''
''A.

That's right."

·'' Q. And inasmuch as you are paying Ashton's, Inc. for the material, you would expect
them to deliver it at your place, and if they didn't
deliver it, why, it wouldn't be your material t"
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
"A.

That's right.''

''MR. RICHARDS:
"That's all."
Plaintiffs' interp·retation of the effect to be given
to the cross-exainination of the witness, C. L. Ashton,
on the point in question, is grounded on the last question of plaintiffs' counsel and the witness' answer
thereto, quoted above. The 'answer simply meant that
if Ashton's, Inc., the applicant, lost the merchandise
en route and failed to make delivery of it in Roosevelt,
the 'vitness would not expect to pay for the merchandise. He might well have added that neither would he
have expected to pay applicant any · of the -hauling
charge between Heber and Roosevelt. No layman could
be expected to reach any other conclusion.
The subject matter of the remarks of counsel and
the testimony, above quoted, had to do with the method
of handling pooled railroad car shipments at Heber
City by the Ashton brothers, for their resp·ective corporations. The several corporations, one (applicant)
at Heber City, another at Roosevelt and t'vo at Vernal,
would join together and buy in carload lots, })iaying
their pro rata share of the freight expenses when the
material was not billed f.o.b. Heber. Reference was
made in the testimony to a shipment received from
Morrison- Merrill, originating, the witness supposed,
somewhere out of the state. Each of the several shippers,
including applicant, was invoiced direct by Morrison~ferrill for its share of the merchandise. The following
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questions put by plaintiffs' counsel, and the answers
made thereto by the witness on cross-examination, beginning on page 624 of the Record, make. very certain
that applicant, in hauling to Roosevelt a portion of the
merchandise received by it in a pooled railroad car at
Heber City, ·was acting :as a carrier of freight for hire
and not as one moving its own merchandise:

''Q. How did you pay for your portion, on
invoice to you or to Lowe 1
''A.. On invoice to me.

"Q. Lowe is Ashton's, Inc.
''A. Th·at's right.
' 'Q. And the invoice to you was direct to
you from Morrison-Merrill?

''A. That's right.
'' Q. Did you see a bill

of lading

"A. No.
'' Q. And yet the invoice was to you!

''A. That's right.
'' Q.

Did you p·ay the freight!

' 'A. I did not.
MR. THURMAN (Counsel for applicant):
You n1ean to Heber?

''A. I paid the freight from Heber to Roosevelt.
. . "Q. But you did not pay any freight on the
· pooled car?
·
''A.

I haven't up to date I know of.
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''Q .. Well, is the price rill's price f.o.b. Heber 1

is Morrison-Mer-

''A. That is my understanding on that particular shipment. I would have to assume that
until such time as I had freight bills showing it
"Tas f.o.b. son1e other point.''
Applicant not only operates a large mercantile
business in Heber City, but also hauls merchandise for
hire for the Ashton interests located at Roosevelt :and
, . .ernal, l,..tah, the n1erchandise
handled originating at
.
-

-

Salt Lake City and Provo as "\vell as Heber City. The nature of applicant's operations is shown throughout the
testimony of Lo\Ye Ashton, the principal owner of the corporate stock of applicant. As to the merchandise received by applicant from the railroad at Heber City,
Mr. Ashton testified at considerable length. On page

202 of the Record, "\Ve find this question and answer:

"Q. In any ~vent, you distribute that merchandise yourself, that portion of it that belongs
to your company in Heber, and that portion that
belongs to Leslie Ashton and Sons Comp.any at
Roosevelt, - you carry - that is, your corporation carries to Roosevelt, and likewise you give
the same service to Vernal for the A~shton Brothers, Inc. ? ''

"A. We do."
The number of carloads of freight handled by
applicant at Heber City in the year 1948, the last full
year prior to the hearing, was 137 (R..200).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
On page 217 of the Record, we ftnd the following
testimony of the witness, Lowe Ashton:
''Q. Now, do you, in order to accommodate
the demands of the two merchants - or, that is,
the one corporation in Roosevelt and the two
corporations in Vernal, - does your company
carry some fill-in orders~

''A.

Stock in Heber?

''Q. Yes.
''A. Oh, yes, we carry a large jobbing stock
in Heber.

"Q. And does that enable you to make
prompt and quick shipments to Roosevelt and
Vernal when the demand is made'
"A. It saves us as much as a day.

'' Q. And does a day mean something occasionally?
"A. Yes sir.

'' Q. Do you maintain a supply of building
material here (Heber City) on hand?
"A.

Yes sir.

"Q.

For that very purpose'

"A.

Yes sir.

'' Q. And is there a common carrier . that
could expeditiously handle that building material
and put it over in Roosevelt iand Vernal as you
are able to handle it?

''A. Well, I am sure there isn-'t, because the
common carrier's schedule goes through here in
the night after we would be closed. ''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Again quoting fro1n the testimony of Lowe Ashton,
beginning on page 335 of the Record, as follows:

''BY MR. THURMAN:
'~Q.

Now, you have referred to maintaining
certain quantities of merchandise stocks on hand
at Heber. That, I think you S'aid, was purchased
by you and kept there. Is that correct 1
"A. It is on hand by Ashton's, Incorporated.

'' Q. Yes. Now, do you ever have calls for
the sale of that merchandise from your brothers'
store at Roosevelt and your brothers' store at
\'ernal !''
(This question was objected to on the ground that
I

it was repetitious, Commissioner Hacking remarking,

"I think he testified from the outset that he did warehouse goods at Heber, and that he loaded goods from
that warehouse.'')
Continuing, from page 336 of the Record:

''Q. Now, if merchandise is ordered from.
you by noon or early afternoon, on a given day,
from Roosevelt, when do you get that into Roosevelt'

"A. Well, if he needs it he will have it that
night. If he needs it today, he will have it that
night.
"Q. And is that true with Vernal, also?
"A.

Yes sir."
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There is ample testimony, we submit, to establish
the existence of a definite need for a certificated contract carrier service from Heber City to Roosevelt and
Vernal, for the transportation of merchandise arriving
by rail at Heber City and invoiced for immediate distribution to the three _ship·pers in the Uintah Basin, or
to be held in stock by applicant for sale and distribution
to them as and when call is made.
(b)

The second category under Point I of plaintiffs'
brief, indentified ·as (b), is directd to the finding of the
Commission that Ashton Brothers, Inc. (at Vernal), and
Leslie Ashton and Sons Company (at Roosevelt), require
the particular service made available by applicant in
order to transport fresh meats, fruits and vegetables.
The finding, dealing with this matter, is the second of
the two special findings heretofore quoted. As a matter
of convenience, \Ve again quote that finding:
"That said two Ashton mercantile shippers,
located at Roosevelt and Vernal, sell large quantities of fresh meats, fruits and vegetables, "rhich
are highly perishable; that applicant, in the transportation of said commodities from Salt Lake to
Roosevelt and Vernal, has made, and is now making, three trips weekly, leaving Salt Lake City
in mid afternoon, and arriving in Heber City in
the early evening, and in Roosevelt and Vernal
at approximately 8 and 9 o'clock P.M., respectively, on the same day; that upon arriving at
destination, applicant unloads said merchandise
and places the same after business hours, in
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refrigerators and coolers located in- the stores
of said two Ashton mercantile shippers, !and that
by such means said Inerchandise is adequately
preserved and can be made ready for display and
sale at the time of the opening of the stores on
the .following n1orning. This practice has continued for ·a long period; and the business methods
?f. the parties have been built upon ~his system.''
A brief reference to· the ~estimony will disclose that
there ·was ample evidence to support that finding.
The element of time,_ in transporting merchandise
~rom

point of origin to point of destination in the Uintah
Basin, it was testified, is an in1portant factor in enabling
the two mercantile institutions at Roosevelt and Vernal
to serve the .public. We quote · the following redirect
testimony of Lowe Ashton, the principal corporate stock
owner ·of applicant, beginning on page 322 of the R~cord:
BY MR. THURMAN:

"Q. Now, Mr. Ashton, do you haul any meat,
do you propose to haul any meat, and have you
been hauling meat for the Vern!al store and the
Roosevelt store from Salt Lake City¥

"A. We do.
'' Q.

Fresh meats¥

' 'A.

Fresh and cured, both.

''Q. Now, where do you pick that meat up
at in Salt Lake City'
''A. From Cudahy's delivery truck.
"Q. Where would that truck be~
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''A. Well, he has, I believe, a set delivery
that meets our truck about one o'clock.
"Q.

One o'clock 'about three times a week7

"A. Yes sir.
"Q. And the meat which you carry to Roosevelt, how do you handle that~

''A. Well, we load all of the meat on approximately the last item we do load, and we carry
it through on the regular freight truck, and unload it in Roosevelt or Vernal.
"Q. - Now, when do you reach Vernal with
that truck1

''A.

Oh, between nine and ten p.m., average.

'' Q.

That is

"A.

Yes sir.

Vernal~

'' Q. Between nine and ten of the. day you
pick up, up around some time after noon~
"A. About one.

'' Q. And then is the Vernal store open at
that time~
''A. Well, they have a night
the stores.

'' Q. Vernal and

m~an

at each of

Roosevelt~

"A. Yes sir.
"Q. And what is done with that meat upon
its arrival in Vernal~

''A. It requires refrigeration immediately,
in the refrigerator.

'' Q. Of course, meat is a perish-able article,
isn't it~
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"A. It is.
'' Q. And if it were left in a truck over night,
what would be the result~
.J..~.

Well, in the summer it wo-q.ld have a
good chance to spoil.
''

"Q. So you put it right in the refrigerator
the night it gets to Vernal; is that correct 1
"A. Yes sir.

'' Q. .And just as soon as it gets there?
''A. Yes sir.
"Q. Now, what time does your truck reach
Roosevelt?

''A. About eight to nine.
'' Q. In the evening~
"A. y es sir.
.
'' Q. Between eight and nine in the evening;
and does the store at Roosevelt handle a considerable quantity of meat~
"A. Yes; they handle more fresh meat than
Vernal by truck.

'' Q. And how do you take

~are

of that upon
arrival in Roosevelt between eight and nine at
night?
"A.

Put it in the refrigerator.

'' Q. Right at the store?

"A. Yes sir.
"Q. Is there a night man there to assist in
·

that work1
"A.

Yes sir.
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'' Q. And you have already stated that the
common carrier truck arriving in Vernal and
Roosevelt is on the day following pick-up in
Salt Lake City¥
·
"A. Yes sir.

''Q. Now, what portion of the merchandise
that you contemplate hauling for the three corporations, two in Vernal, one in Roosevelt-what
portion of that, based on your experience, will
.be made up of the heavier materials such as
cement and lumber?
"A. About fifty per cent.

''Q. About fifty i>:er cent would be lumber
~and cement; is that correct?
"A.

Of our total freight we haul.

'',Q. Yes?
"A. Between fifty and sixty per cent.

''Q. I see. And what would the p·ercentage
be on the balance, say forty or fifty per cent of
the balance, would be made up of groceries and
-other merchandise, wouldn't it?

''A. Yes.
"Q. And what per cent of that forty or
fifty per cent .would be made up of groceries?
''A. Well, maybe I could answer better by
giving·you one specific truck that we run on Monday, Wednesday and ·Friday.

'' Q. All right, go ahead.
''A. That truck hauls the intrastate freight.
That would include hardware and dry goods and
some building materials, groceries, :and fruit and
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vegetables, and I usually figure that that load is
going to run from seventy-from .sixty-five to
seventy-five per cent groceries and p·erishable
fruit and vegetables. Is that what-?

"Q. Yes. Sixty-five to seventy-five per cent
groceries and perishable fruits and vegetables;
1s that correct 1

''A. Yes, that is.''
Again, from the. direct testimony of C. L. Ashton,
beginning on page 583 of the Record: .

'' Q.

Now, """here do you :purchase your meats?

''A. Some of our meats locally, in and about
Roosevelt; but beef and cured meats are all purchased, practically exclusively, from Cudahy's,
with some small fraction coming from American
Packing Company.
"Q. And how is it hauled to you at Roosevelt
from Cudahy .and the American Packing Company'
''A. By Ash tons, Inc.
'' Q. When is that merchan<lise picked up
In Salt Lake City or in Ogden'
''A. Well, today is a typical example-this
is the day they pick it up. I would say it would
be picked up here around one or two o'clock today, or in that neighborhood, just before the ,
truck would leave.

''Q. That would be on
"A.

Monday~

Yes sir, that is today.

'' Q. And when will that merchandise be delivered to you at Roosevelt?
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''..A.. Approximately eight o'clock tonight.
"Q. Ap·proximately eight o'clock tonight?
''A.

Yes sir.

'' Q. What is done with it when- it reaches
Roosevelt?

"A. We have a night man, and it is taken
off the truck and p·ut in the cooler.
'' Q. Is your store closed at that time to the
general public~

"A.

Closed at six o'clock.

''Q. But upon its arrival around eight o'clock
it is taken· off by the night man~

''A. All of our meat is taken off by the
night man.

''Q. And what is done with that by the
night man'

''A. Placed in refrigeration;.
'' Q. In your place

o~

business Y

"A. Yes sir.
'' Q. If it were allowed to remain on the
truck over night, would that be detrimental to
your meat business~

''A. If it was warm weather or extremely
cold, either one, would be hazardous for the
spoilage of meat.

''Q. What would the effect of extremely cold
weather have on it~
''A. Meat shouldn't be frozen and then
thawed.
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''Q. This n1eat you purchas:e, when you get
it from Cudahy, has it been frozen~
'• A.

No sir, it is just well chilled.

'' Q.

So it should not be frozen

thereafter~

" . A.. Meat can't be frozen and then thawed
out and placed back in refrigeration and have
. good meat.

''Q. And of course, what effect would extremely warm weather, or summer weather, have
on meat carried on a truck through the night~

"A. You would get a sweaty, slimy condition in the meat, which would cause it soon to
decay and rot,-spoil.
.'' Q. Could you remain in business and com-:pete with your competitor if you didn't have
this type of service for your meat~"

"MR. RICHARDS: I will object on the
ground there is no showing that he has tried
any other type of service. ·

''MR. THURMAN: W·ell, he has shown quite
a bit of qualification.
"A. Well, I can .answer that. I have, and
I have had it delivered at five o'clock in the
afternoon."COM. HACKING: Just a minute, Mr. Ashton.
· ·
''MR. THURMAN: We will submit the question.
''COM. HACKING: The objection will be
overruled.
''MR. THURMAN: Overruled 1
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''COM. HACKING: Overruled.
''MR. THURMAN: Now, just state''COM. HACKING: Answer the question.
'' MR: THURMAN: Read the question, Mr.
Johnson, if you will, please.
(Thereupon the last question was read by
the reporter, as follows:)
'' Q. Could you remain· in business and comp·ete with your competitor if you didn't have
this type of service for your meat?
''A. Well, I guess if a person-if we ·went
back to handling just home-grown and slaughtered meat, that it would be possible to stay in
business, but we couldn't serve the public with
Grade A beef that we could get out of Cudahy's
unless it could be bought there .and kept 1n a
Grade A condition.

BY MR. THURMAN:

"Q. Now, after you receive meat at your
place of business at Roosevelt~ does it take some
time to put the merchandise into your store and
have it all ready for the public, your customers Y
''A. Yes. Naturally you would have to unp.ack it and check it and mark it.
"Q. And is your night man able to put
that in stock and have it ready for the public
by the following morning?
''A. .He doesn't do that, no sir.
He doesn't do that 7
"A. N o. sir.
.
'' Q.
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'' Q. Your em!ployees who come ·in the morning do that, is that correct'

"A. Yes sir.

''Q.

Now~ do you have other perishable shi~

Il)~nts ~esides

n1eat that you sell at your place

-of business in Roosevelt~

-· "A~- .Well,-we don't have-we get our vegetables a little differently than Vernal; so that
part doesn't affect us the same as it. qoes Vernal.

''Q. I see.
"A. ..\Ve have other perishable items, but''Q. What other -perishable items do you
have'
''A. We handle frozen foods in our locker
business, and we also have the ice cream products
that come in.
'' Q. Do you handle
''·A.
'' Q.
from'

vegetables~

Yes.
And where do you get your vegetables

''A. We get most of ours from Perry Harper that come into Salt Lake, and Norton's that
. come into Provo .. They come out there and sell
it to us.
'' Q.

From peddlers, so to

speak~

''A. Right.

"Q. So, Ashton's, Inc. doesn't haul vegetables from Salt Lake to Roosevelt for you?
''A.

They haul some, but not like--

'' Q.

Not like they do in Vernal t
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''A.

No, not like they do in Vernal.''

And again, from the redirect testimony of the witness, C. L. Ashton, beginning on page 631 of the Record:

''Q. Now, you said in answer to Mr. Richards that you bought the majority of your green
stuff from peddlers coming through there two or
three times a week?

''A. That'·s right.
''Q. Now, green stuff, of course you mean by
that vegetables and perishables~
"A. Yes. Well, in food, except vegetables
and fruit, I would s~y in the main.

"Q. From whom or how do you get the balance of your green stuff?
''A. We order the same as he does in V ernal. Things that we can't get from these p·eddlers,
we send in an order to the Pacific people and
get it.

''Q. At Salt Lake

City~

''A. And the same procedure.
"Q. And I take it Ashton's, Inc. brings that
on to you~
''A.

That's right.

''Q. And is that green stuff brought in by
Ashton's, Inc. handled in the same manner as
your meats-?
''A. We have a refrigerator for both vegetables and meats, separate.
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'~Q. So that the·· green stuff reaches you the
night before you put it on the n1arket in Roosevelt, is that correct J?

''A.

Yes, that's right.''

.r\..11 of the \Yitne~se~ called by applicant gave testiInony showing the .need of a type of service offered by
applicant to meet the requirements of the three shippers,
one located at Roosevelt, and two at Vernal, and some
of those \Yitnesses gave testimony sufficient to definitely
establish that the co1nmon carrier service made available to the public by plaintiffs was inadequate to meet
said ship.pers' requirements.

Contrast the type of service which the record shows
applicant offered to perform and -vvhich the record
sho-vvs the three shippers required, with the common
carrier service rendered by plaintiffs into Roosevelt and ·
Vernal. We quote from the redirect testimony of the
witness, C. L. Ashton, beginning on page '639 of the
Record:

"Q. Now, are you familiar with Uintah
Freight Line trucks, that is, the a~p.pearance of
them as you see them on the road~

''A. I am.
"Q. Are they identified with any

lettering~

''A. Yes.
''Q. And what is that lettering'
''A. Well, in most instances it is '' Uintah
Freight Lines'', -and a lot of the operations that
come out there are marked ''Inland."
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"Q. "Inland" or "Uintah Freight Lines"!

''A.

That's right.
I

''Q. Now, have you seen them op·erate leaving Roosevelt going easterly toward VernalY

"A. I have.
''Q. In the early morning hours?
''A. Yes sir.

The morning
"A. Y·es sir.

'' Q.

hours~

''Q. And what time have you seen them
operate leaving Roosevelt 1
MR. RICHARDS: Objection; no time and
place being stated,-indefinite and uncertain.
BY MR. THURMAN:
"Q. During the last few months.
MR. RICHARDS: Immaterial.
BY MR. THURMAN:
"Q. During the last few months.
COM. HACKING: What do you want to
show by this ~
MR. THURMAN: I want to show they lea:ve
Roosevelt late.
MR. RICHARD·S: He doesn't even know
whether there is any cargo in them.
MR. THURMAN: That is all right.
MR. RICHARDS: I object to it as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial,-and no showing
as to the time and place.
MR. _THURMAN : I am trying to get the time
~_nd place.
COM. HACKING: Well, the witness may
answer.
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MR. THURMAN: Go ahead.

''A. I see the trucks pass our place of business after I go down to work in the morning.
.

.

'

''Q. Have you kept any exact time as to
when you sa:\v them?

''A. I haYe not.
Do you see then1 always at the same
time leaving Roosevelt?
'' Q.

''A. I don't. Sometimes I don't see them· at
all.

"Q. Well, what hours have you seen them,
we will say during this year'
·
''A. Well, I ordinarily - I go down to work
approximately somewhere in the neighborhood of
seven.o'clock in the morning, and I have seen the
trucks go by going east after I have arrived at
the store.

"Q. Do you know how ·late you have seen
them pass your place on the way going east?
''A. No. I know that they rp:ass after-·I have
seen them pass after I get to work.

"Q. And you say it is thirty miles between
Roosevelt and Vernal'
"A.

That's right."

Nowhere in the testimony of p·laintiffs' witnesses
do we find any claim that plaintiffs' trucks could or did
reach Roosevelt and Vernal before the morning of the
day following the loading of the merchandise in Salt
Lake City. This, applicant's shipper witnesses testified,
did not enable them to meet the needs of the buying
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public at Roosevelt and Vernal. And the shipper witnesses, in their testimony hereinbefore quoted, gave the
particulars in which, and the reasons why, the service
offered by plaintiffs was not adequate to meet the needs
in question.
(c)
The third and last category under Point I of plaintiffs' brief, identified as (c), is directed to the finding
of the Commission relating to emergency calls for
cement in truckload quantities from Devil 's Slide,, Utah.
The finding in question is the third of the three specific
findings, to which reference has heretofore been made
in this brief, and, for convenience, it is again quoted:
''That said three shi~.pers have emergency rush
calls, arising p~articularly from the oil drilling,
and the building construction incident thereto, in
the Roosevelt .and Vernal areas, for cement in
truck load quantities; that said comn1odity is
~ighly competitive and is. available, at Devil 's
Slide, Utah, at a slightly lower price than in the
Salt Lake City market; that protestant, Uintah
Freight Lines, does not operate between Devil's
Slide. and the Uintah Basin, and that none of the
other protestants has offered to perform said
transportation service between Devil 's Slide and
the Uintah Basin or do they have equipment stationed at any point along the route, or has stated
that it was :able to perform the kind of service
required by said three 'Shippers.''
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We have heretofore stated that the hauling of
cement from Devil 's Slide to Roosevelt and Vernal,
Utah, was wholly immaterial to any issue involved in
the matters now under consideration. The only testimony in the record relating to carrier service available
between Devil 's Slide and points within the Uintah
Basin has to do "~ith the service ~performed by Ashworth Transfer Company, a partnership, and Salt L~k~
Transfer Company, a partnership, both of which had
common carrier rights over practically all ,the highways
of the State of Utah, including the highways between
Devil's Slide and the Uintah Basin. Plaintiffs made
reference to these rights on page 4 of their brief, stating that after the hearing had been under way for some
time, "These carriers joined in the protest insofar a.s
it involved transportation of cement from Devil's Slide,
Utah, to Heber City, Roosevelt, and Vernal, Utah, and
it was stipulated that these two carriers are common
carriers with operating authority and adequate equipment at all times to transport required commodities, including cement, between Devil's Slide and Heber City_,
Roosevelt, and Vernal, Utah." While the record shows
that such a stipulation was in fact entered into (R. 879880), it is nevertheless apparent that the p·ermit issued
by the Public Service Commis-sion, here under consideration, insofar as the granting of the right to operate
between Devil's Slide and the two points in the Uintah
Basin is concerned, is not now a subject for review by
this Court. The two partn-ership carriers (Ashworth
Transfer Company and Salt Lake Transfer Company)
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alone had the right to complain, but neither filed a petition nor joined with plaintiffs in their petition for a
writ of review. Following the granting of the permit by
the Commission, none ·of the required statutory steps
was taken to ·invoke -the jurisdiction of. this Court to
review the legality of that portion ·of the Commission's
order granting applicant a permit between Devil 's Slide
and the Uintah Basin.
At the outset· of their discussion under this headmg (plaintiffs' brief, p.age 17), category (c), plaintiffs
state that "The transportation of cement from Devil's
Slide to Heber City, Roosevelt and Vernal, is the most
important item involved iri the hearing." In support of
this statement, they refer to the testimony of Lowe Ashton, principal ow·ner of the corporate ·stock of ap:plicant (R. 299), wherein the witness testified that the
hauling of cem~nt during the year 1948 constituted about
one-:half of the tonnage handled by .applicant. '' * • *
But, despite this,'' plaintiffs further state on page 18
of their brief, ''no request was ever made upon Uintah
Freight Lines· to transport cement.'' (R. 425.)
Presumably, plaintiffs felt that they should have
had the business. The shippers, however, it is reasonable to assume, desired to make their purchases of cement at D·evil 's Slide, and neither of the rplainti:ffs had
operating rights to or from that 1point, the Uintah
Freight Lines having rights between Salt Lake City
and the Uintah Ba.sin only (R. 67, 68, 69 and 70), and
Eastern Utah Transportation Company between Price
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and the Uintah Basin only (R. 67 and 70). The shippers, we submit, were not limited, in purchasing their
cement, to points in the territory covered by plaintiffs'
certificate of convenience and necessity, one of which
points was Salt Lake City. And this is so despite the
inference implicit in the complaint of the p·lainti:ff, Uintah Freight Lines, appearing at the top of page 19 of
their brief. The haul which that plaintiff had in mind
was from Salt Lake City-not Devil 's Slide-to the destination points in question. This is made clear by the
cross-examination of Ray Lilenquist, the principal owner
of the corporate stock of the two plaintiff companies, in
explaining why the Uintah Freight Lines got no cement
haul at all in 1948. We quote from the Record, beginning on page 814:
"BY MR. THURMAN:
"Q. Did I understand you to say, Mr. Lilenquist, that in 1948 Ashtons carried cement, a
large quantity of cement, and that was one of
the reasons why you lost-or dropped in your
tonnage in 1948 over 1947~
"A. You understood me to say that '47 we
hauled quite a sizeable quantity of cement, and
we didn't haul any in 1948, _the reason being that
the account was lost to Ashton brothers and that
they hauled the cement.
"Q. In other words, it was taken by Ashton
Brothers, Inc. at Vernal, where theretofore some
one of your shippers had furnished. it~

"A. No, I understood that Ashton Brothers,
Inc. was at Heber City. It w.as taken by Rae
Ashton at Vernal.
·
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· . '' Q.

Ashton Brothers, Inc. is at Vernal.·

"A. Well, if that is correct, why that's
right.
Now, who was the owner and seller of
that cement that you handled in 1947~
'' Q.

''A. Well, the biggest supplier" of it was the
Ketchum Builders.

· "Q.
"A.

Ketchum Builders in Salt Lake ··city~
Yes sir.''

·It is quite· impossible to understand any basis for
plaintiffs' position that upon their protest, the Commission ·had no right to grant a contract carrier permit to
an applicant seeking -to op·era te between Devil' s Slide
and the Uintah··Basin, a route not covered by plaintiffs'
operating rights, or that shippers locateq. within the
Uintah Basin were li1nited, in buying their cement, to
Salt L~ke City, Utah, silnply because. Uintah Freight
Lines V\ as authorized to serve the Uintah Basin from
that point, but ·not from Devil's Slide.
7

We might also add that the evidence shows that
Ashworth Transfer Company and Salt Lake Transfer
Company have their principal and sole places of business in Salt Lake City, Utah; therefore, by reason of
that fact, those carriers could not give the expeditious
se!"vice requited at times by the Ashton Mercantile
establishments located .at Roosevelt and Vernal, Utah,
for the handling of emergency shipments from Devil's
Slide to Uintah Basin. The distance from Salt Lake
City to Devil 's Slide 1-s approximately one hundred
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miles, and both fac.tors of time and expense involved in
this .additional mileage might make unavailable or prohibitive any dependable service from Devil 's Slide.

POINT II.
THE FINDING THAT ASHTON'S, INC., DID NOT WILFULLY TRANSPORT COMMODITIES WITHOUT AUTHORITY, CAN NOT BE SUPPORTED.

At the outset of their discussion under this heading
(page 19, their brief), rplaintiffs state that "The report
of the Commission rather gives the impression that the
transp-ortation service of Ashton's at Heber City was
.lawful until Ashton's, Inc., was formed in 1946, '' and
then add, ''There is no basis for this impression, as it
is plain that for twenty years or so the businesses in
the three towns have been separate and the fact that
they were owned as stockholders or partners by t~e
same three p~ersons, would not identify their interests
and obviate the obtaining of certificates from the Public
Service Commission.''
We agree with plaintiffs that whenever members of
the Ashton family operated their business interests as
corporations, after the enactment of Chapter 53, Laws
of Utah,. 1933, the transportation of their merchandise
into the Uintah Basin by some member of the family, to
whom the corporations tp.aid the hauling charge, was a
technical violation of the Utah Public Utility law. But
we deny that in so transporting said merchandise there
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was any wilful intent on the part of the hauler, applicant
in. ·~he insta.nt prQceeding, to viola.te. the law.
.

.

.

Prior to the Le.gisla.tive Act of 1933, a motor vehicle acting as a carrier of freight, was identified in our
law as a "motor transportation corporation'', and was
.defined· as a carrier engaged in or transacting the busi-ness. of transporting freight; merchandise or other
property, for more than. one person, under ·contract or
otherwise (Section 76-5-1, Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933), and. in that year the Legislature eliminated the
''for more than one person'' p.rovision and defined a
contract motor ·-carrier as any person engaged in the
transportatio.n by motor- vehicle of property for hire
and not included in the · definition of a cominon motor
.carrier of. property.
.

.

In nearly every session of the Utah Legislature
since the enactment of the Public Utility law in 1917,
the laws relating to the control of motor vehicles for
hire,· and the definitions as to what constitutes a motor
vehicle for hire, have undergone changes. Little wonder
that on the part of the general public, there has been
more or fess uncertainty as to just what· this changing
law was at any particular time.
Since the establishment of the mercantile institutions by Leslie Ashton in the Uintah Basin, beginning
as far back as 1898, one or more members of his family
(now consisting of his widow, M~s. Leslie Ashton, and
their three sons) have acted as the hauling agent for
the Ashton interests. Mercantile institutions were estab-
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lished at both Roosevelt and Vernal, and later at Heber
City, a point outside the Uintah Basin. The kind and
type of entity owning the separate institutions changed
from time to time, back and forth, but the members of
the Ashton family always retained prop.riet.ary control.
The right to so operate, in serving the Ashtons,
without a permit so to do from the Commission, was
never challenged, nor was complaint made, to or by the
Commission, until shortly prior to the filing of applicant's instant application for a permit to operate as a
contract motor carrier of property for the Ashton- corporations at Roosevelt and Vernal,. Utah. Complying
with the request of a representative of the Commission,
applicant filed such an application on January 30, 1948.
(R. 1 and 2.)
Through~ut

their testimony the three sons of Leslie
Ashton stated that they at all times regarded and looked
upon the three mercantile institutions as a family affair.
No other persons at .any time had any interest whatsoever in any of the institutions op~erated by them in Roosevelt, Vernal and Heber City. They apparently knew,
following the enactment of the 1933 Public Utility law,
relating to- the operation of motor vehicles for hire, if.
'

'

the member of the family who was hauling the ~erchan
dise at any particular tirrie desired to haul merchandise
for some outside interest, not a member of the family,
that the law required the securing of a contract carrier
permit from the Public Service Commission.. And they
comrp.lied ~th that law when, in 1938, aft€:r. ·entering into
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a contract with the Shell Oil Company for the transportation of that company's products from Salt Lake
City to Heber City and Roosevelt, applicant filed an
application for a contract carriers' permit, and, after
a hearing before the Commission, permit No. 206 was
granted to haul the products of the Shell Oil Company.
(R. 175-176.)

But the point now under consideration in this brief
1s whether applicant, under all the circumstances disclosed by the record, was guilty of wilful intent to violate
the Utah law. The Commission, in its report, after an
extended hearing of the case, both in Heber City and
Salt Lake City, made detailed findings of the manner
in which ..the. family operated and changed its operations in the towns of Roosevelt and Vernal. The findings as to such opera-tions are contained within the two
paragraphs heretofor,e quoted in this brief, and are followed by the paragraph in which the Commission
found''That there is no evidence of wilful intent to
violate the law during the many years that Leslie
Ashton, deceased, or one or more of his said three
sons, as individuals, or as partners, or as corporations, have transported merchandise from
S.alt Lake City to Heber City, Roosevelt and Vernal, Utah, serving Ashton mercantile stores and
gasoline service station located in said cities, and
the Commission has treated the operations as private hauls." (R. 105.)
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The finding of the Comn1ission as to the manner in
\Vhich it, the Commission itself, looked u1pon and regarded the transp.ortation operations in question, with
which operations it had been familiar over a long period
of time, is of itself sufficient to show that there was no
wilful intent to violate the law. What more could the
Commis·sion do to make clear its own attitude on the
issue of wilful intent, than to find that the ''Commission
has treated the operations as private hauls''? Because
of the practice that had been developed ~d followed by
the members of the Ashton family in establishing and
developing mercantile institution'S in the Uintah B·asin,
and in supplying those institutions with all necessary
transportation facilities, the Ashton family, quite the
same as the Commission, looked upon its tran'Sportation
op-erations as "private hauls". If the Commission so
regarded such transportation operations, then how can
it be s.aid that applicant was guilty of wilful intent, if it
entertained the same view?
In concluding their discussion of the question of
wilful violation, beginning on page 21 of their brief,
plaintiffs state ''There is not one word of testimony in
this very lengthy record which says that any one of the
three Ashton brothers was ignorant of. the requirements
of the law, and that he believed that their operation complied with the law, and that a certificate was unnecessary because of the family relationship. * * * ''
The record discloses that our opponents err in
making such statement.
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. At one point in his testimony, Lowe Ashton, while
under cross examination by plaintiffs, was interrogated
relative to applicant's filing annual reports with the
Public Service Commission. Beginning on page 280
or the Record, we quote the following:
'' Q. What year is the report you have
your hand'

''A. '48.
''Q. · It is

In

'48~

''A. ·This only covers the equipment ·that is
under 206 (referring to Permit No. 206, granting
authority to haul Shell Oil Comp-any products),
too.

"Q. Will you show us in the exhibit-in
· your Ashton's, Inc. report, annual report for
1948, that you have in your hand, the profit and
loss statement or operating statement that appears therein~

''A. This does not cover Ashton's, Inc., and
we were requested--by telephone by Mr. Stringham to not put into this re,p.ort anything that
pertained to the operation other than the hauling
of Shell petroleum products ..
'' Q.

Who made that request of you!

''A. Mr. Stringham.
''Q. What Stringham~

''A. Well, I believe he was secretary here, or
something.

"Q. And how .long ago T
''A.

About three months ago.
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'' Q. So that the report that you filed in
1948 does not contain any account of your operations for 1948 for transportation to Leslie Ashton an~ Sons Company and Ashton Brothers,
Inc. 1

"A. No sir.

"Q. Have you made any report of that operation 7
"A. No sir.
'' Q. I am talking, to the Public Service Commission. You have made none to the Public Service Commission 7

''A. We have made all reports the Public
Service Commission has asked us to make.

''Q. Yes. That is based on Mr. Stringham's
statement to you'
''A.

That's right.

"Q. · Was that statement in writing¥
''A.

No. It was over the telephone.

'' Q.

You called him, or did he call you 1

''A. I believe he called me, but I am not
sure.

''Q. Well, you would know, wouldn't you,
whether you had occasion to call him on the
subject1
''A. I have called and talked to the Commission at different times, and to Mr. Slaughter,
but .I wouldn't remember whether he · called me
or I called him.

"Q. When did you call Mr. Slaughter last
about· this subject of including the operations Y
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"A. I didn't talk to Mr. Slaughter about this.
not~

'' Q.

Oh, you did

"A.

No sir.

"Q.

Just talked to Mr. Slaughter abo.ut your

operations~

''A. Yes.
And did Mr. Slaughter tell you whether
or not it was lawful'' Q.

'' A. Mr. Slaughter told us the Commission's
attitude, he thought, would be for us to go on .and
continue until such time as the hearing was held.
We have operated that way for over a year.
"Q. And you have been operating for the
last year under that arrangement. Did he tell
you why a hearing was necessary?

"A. No. We just received -

You mean

originally~

' 'Q. Y e.s, over a year ago.

''A. Well,_ they were going to have a hearing on this entire· case, but it would normally
· have been called, I guess, the first part of 1948.
''Q. Did he tell you why it w.as necessary to
have a hearing?
''A. We presumed it was necessary because
of the change in the - apparently in the change•
of operation, is all.
''Q. Why didn't you file your ap.plication
when you changed your operation in 1945?

A. W c didn't think we needed to. We were
op~ratin!J .as we always had, in so far as our feelq
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ings toward each other were concerned, and we
just didn't make a new application.

"Q. By that, Mr. Ashton, you .mean that you
had the same financial arrangements 1
''A.

I said ''feelings''.

"Q. Well, what do you mean by "feelings"?

''A. Well, brotherly interest, I guess.
"Q.

That is, of helping each other?

"A. No, it was just going on the same way
and doing-

'' Q. How was it going on?
''A. We were buying together, and those
things have never changed.

'' Q. Your
the same'

~.ractices

of buying together were

''A. Yes.
''Q. And continued tn be the same. What
other practices continued to be the same'
''A. The practice of hauling the freight continued the same, and we continued to distribute
the same type of gasoline with the same type of
arrangement with the supplier. There were no
changes except the financial change in our structure and our businesses.''
The finding by the Commission of the absence of
evidence of wilful intent to violate the law, we submit,
is amply supported by the record.
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POINT III.
THE COMMISSION ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT ONLY
WILFUL VIOLATIONS PRECLUDE THE GRANTING OF
CERTIFICATES.

While the Commission did not expressly find, conclude or hold, as contended for by plaintiffs, that ''only
wilful vi.olat~ons preclude the granting of certificates,"
it is nevertheless reasonable to assume that the Commission was acting on the concept that such rule of
p.rocedure was the proper one to pursue, when it included 'vithin its Report the finding"That there is no evidence of wilful intent to
violate the law during the many years that Leslie
Ashton, deceased, or one or more of his said three
sons, as individuals, or as 'partnerships, or as
corporations, have transported merchandise from
Salt Lake City to Heber City, Roosevelt and Vernal, Utah, serving the Ashton Mercantile Stores
rand gasoline service .station, located in said cities,
and the Commission has treated the operations as
private hauls.''
Nowhere in the Utah statute, relating to the gr~ant
~ng of a permit to a contract motor carrier, is it expressly said that one who may have operated in violation of the law, even wilfully, is not entitled to and
cannot receive a permit. The law itself is silent respecting past operations. The statutory requirements
for the granting of a contract motor carrier permit are
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set forth in the second paragraph of Section 76-5-21,
Chapter 105, Laws of Utah, 1945. The paragraph reads:
''CONTRACT CARRIER COMMERCE- PERMIT.

"· ...

INTRASTATE

''The commission upon the filing of an application for a contract motor carrier's permit, shall
fix a time and place for hearing thereon .and may
give the same notice as provided in section 765-18 hereof. If, from all the testimony offered at
said hearing, the commission shall determine that
the highways over which the applicant desires to
operate are not unduly burdened; that the granting of the application will not unduly interfere
with the traveling public; and that the granting
of the application will not be detrimental to_ the
best interests of the people of the State of Utah
and/or to the localities to be servedt and if the
existing transportation facilities do not provide
adequate or reasonable service, the Commission
shall grant such permit. ''

Each and all of those statutory requirements, th.e
Commission found, had been met by applicant .
. For use by prospective applicants the Commission
maintains a supply of printed forms of application.
P·aragraph 9 of the form reads:
"9. That applicant will com~ly with all provisions and requirements of the laws of the State
of Utah relative to the .operation of motor vehicles for hire, .and will comply with :al~ the rules
and regulations promulgated by the Public Service Commission of Utah ...''
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Such · a form w.aAs used and sworn to .by applicant
in the instant proceeding when it filed its api>lication
with the Commission on January 30, 1948. (R. 2.) And
upon the hearing of the application, and before ruling
thereon, it was proper for the commission to inquire
into and determine, and it was its inherent right so to
do, whether applicant would, if granted a permit, comply with the law, and the Commission's rules and regulations. H~aving, from the testimony introduced at the
hearing, resolved the question of ''intent'', the Commission found there was no -evidence of wilful intent, and,
obviously based upon its own experience with the Ashton operations, significantly added to that finding, that
the ''commission has treated the operations as private
hauls."
(

Certainly, where a clear case of wilful intent to
violate the law is sh,own, the Commission, in the exercise
of its discretion, would be justified in denying an application. But the same logic that suggests such a ruling
also suggests that where there is shown no wilful intent
to violate the law, and where all of the specified requirements of the statute have been met, the application
should be granted.
From a review of the cases and of the. Commission
Reports, cited ·and quoted from by plaintiffs (pages 22
to 29, their brief), the most that can be said is that certain regulatory commissions, including the Utah Commission, have at ·times, in passing on applications for
certificates of convenience and necessity and for contract
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carrier permits, denied the application when it was
shown that applicant had operated contrary to law. All
of the cases ·and reports cited, however, deal ·either (1)
with an application where a wilful violation of the law
is affirmatively and expressly found, or (2) with one
showing prior violations with no express finding as to
whether the operation was or was not carried on with
wilful intent to violate the law, but always where there
was, from the evidence, an inescapable inference of a
wilful violation.
Only two of the Utah cases and reports cited (D. &
R. G. W. R. R. v. Linck, 56 F. 2d 957, and Rowley v.
:· P. S. C., 112 Utah 116, 185 P. 2d 514), reached the
courts. None -of the other Utah cas.es and reports proceeded beyond the Public Service Commission.
Brief reference to the cases ·and reports will establish that they are not in any . sense in conflict .with the
ruling of the Commission in the instant proceeding. ·They
will be referred to in the order of th·eir ap~p.earance in
plaintiff's brief.

Denver & Rio ·Grande Western Railroad Company
vs. Linck, 56 F. 2d 957; Case No. 1000 before Public
Utilities ·Commission of Utah, Commission's report ·
dated De.cember 26, 1928:
Plaintiffs refer to the Denver ~and Rio Grande case,
decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Tenth
Circuit, and to Case No. 1000 before the Public Utilities
Commission of Utah, as being the ''same case.'' This
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staten1ent, however, is not in complete accord with the
facts.
One Linck and his associates, in Case No. 1000,
made application before the Public Utilities Commission
of Utah for a certificate of convenience· and necessity,
and, on December 26, 1928, the application was denied,
the Commission finding that "applicants have been operating for hire, trans1porting freight and express for
numerous persons; firms .and corporations and appear
to be in violation of ~Chapter 42, Session Law·s of Utah~
19·27, and that such op·erators who violate the provisions
of the State law should not be rewarded with certificates
of convenience and necesstiy. '' The report of the Commission, an examination will disclose, is extremely brief,
and, while it did not specifically find that the applicants
had, prior to the filing of the a:pplication, wilfully operated in violation of the law, it did find that they transported
freight for ''numerous persons, firms and corporations.''
Had applicants' operations, prior to the filing of the
application, not been in wilful violation of the law, and
had all statutory requirements been met by applicants,
the a;pplication, we submit, would have been granted.
Notwithstanding the refusal of the Utah Commission to grant the application, Linck himself undertook
to circumvent the law, whieh, the case clearly shows, he
intended to do, by restricting his operations to 117 consignees, who were customers of Scowcroft & Sons Company, wholesale grocers. The Railroad operated under
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ritory sought to be served by Linck, and, in an action
filed by it in the Federal Court, prayed for an injunction. The trial court granted a preliminary injunction,
and this determination was reaffirmed at the final hearing, with the exception that the trial court refused to
enjoin the defendant Linck from operating under the
Scowcroft contract. The Railroad appealed to the Circuit Court. We quote two paragraphs of the Court's
opm1on, affirming the granting of the injunction: (1p.
960.)
''The Linck operations, subsequent to the p·reliminary ·injunction, had been restricted to 117
consignees, who were customers of Scowcroft &
Sons Company. This alone is the only element
which· differentiates . his operations from those
prior to the issuance of the preliminary injunction. In all other respects his operations are
similar. The fact that he ceased to be associated
.in interest in the operation of trucks with other
defendants who 1purported to transport freightunder private contracts is not material. The fact
that there has been a restriction in the number
of consignees he serves, or the limitation of the
consignees to those that are customers of a particular concern, does not change Linck's operations from those of a common earrier. See Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Kutz, 241 U. S. 252, 36 S.
Ct. 583, 60 L. Ed. 984, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 765.
''In our opinion, the Scowcroft contract is ~ sub~
terfuge employed by Linck for the continuation
of the business that he was doing illegally. Had
there been a bona fide contract iand an operation
thereunder, Linck's operations may not have
fallen under those·of a common carrier. It is apSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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parent that the Scowcroft contract, while in form
a contract for delivery of goods to the customers
of Scowcroft & Sons Company, is in substance a
subterfuge by which Linck is to be permitted to
continue in the operation of autotrucks for the
transportation of freight in competition with aJp-pellants, who are the holders of the legal right
to operate in the particular territory.''
Nothing further need be said, we feel, concerning the
Linck matters. Obviously, both the Commission and the
Court were dealing with a case of wilful intent to violate
the law, conclusively est;ablished by the evidence.
In the Matter of the Application of M. C. West and
R. A. Nielsen, and the Application of Ry A. Nielsen, M.
C. West and Jack Miller, Cases Nos. 975 and 985, Public
Utilities Co1nmission of Utah (June 13, 1928), 11 Utah
P.U.C.R. 27:
Here again the Commission found that ''applicants
have been operating for hire, transporting freight and
express for nunterous firms"', persons and corporations",
and again the Commission's report is very brief. It is
fair to assume, however, in view of the finding that
applicants had been operating for numerous firms, persons and corporations, a wilful violation was shown.
In the Matter of the Application of J. L. Coons,
Q,ase No. 1354, Public Utilities Commission of Utah
(August 16, 1933}, 16 Utah P.U.•C.R. 205:
The application in this case was denied for the
reason "That applicant had for the prior four years
operated in violation of Chapter 42, Session Laws of
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Utah, 1929, in that he failed to procure a 1permit before
commencing operations for more than one person, firm
or corporation; that he failed to comply with the provisions of Chapter 17, Session Laws of Utah 1925, in that
he had not filed report covering his operations for hire
over the highways and paid the taxes thereon. '' On the
question of failing to pay the taxes, assessable against
his operation, the Commission's report shows that applicant stated ''He would be willing to pay the tax on
his operations provided other operators are required to
do so.'' While there is no express finding as to whether
applicant was or was not guilty of wilful intent to violate
the law, still, we feel it is fair to assume that the Commission was of the opinion that there was evidence of
that fact. It is hardly believable that had applicant's
operations been bona fide, that that matter would not
have been brought to the attention of the Commission.
It was not for the Commission to prove that applicant's
operations were bona fide; the burden was on ~rupplicant
80 to do.
In the Matter of the A;pplication of Don H. Anderson, Case No. 2150, Public Service Commission of Utah
(iOctober 21, 1:938):

In this case, in that portion of the report quoted
by plaintiffs in their brief (page 25), the Commission
stated that the applicant had testified that he had been
hauling for some time without authority; that he was
arrested and fined for such violation in 1937, one year
prior to the hearing before the Commission; that he was
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:again apprehended by ins:pectors of the Public Service
Commission on August 3, 1938, which was prior to the
.Commission's hearing, "but that he had not operated in
violation of the law since August 3, 1938. '' In its findings, _the Commission also found that'' It is somewhat doubtful if there is any particular need for the service. It ·also appears from
the evidence that the applicant has persisted
knowingly on. numerous occasions, both before
and since August 3, 1938, in transporting commodities for hire in violation of the laws of this
state and of the rules and regulations of the
Commission. * * * ''
· Little wonder the Commission held that it was not
consistent with the Motor V-ehicle Act to grant authority
to a person under such conditions, even though the need
-of the service 1proposed, and the other determining factors, were f-avorable to the granting of the application.
- ·Decision of Public .Service Commission -of New
York in case of in re. Unauthorized Bus Operations
_(1.;941) 40 f. U. R. (N_S) 40:
The portion ·of the holding of this case, quoted by
plainti:ffis (page 26, their brief), should he sufficient to
.bring it within the category of the other cases and reports above discussed. The Commission decided that
''Hereafter no authority will be granted to an operator
guilty of illegal operation at the time. That all illegal
operation· must cease and that every applicant must
come before .the Commission with clean hands and se·
cure full legal authority to operate before proce·eding."
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Motor Truck Transfer, Inc., v. Southwestern Transportation Company (Dec. 1 938} 122 S.IW. 2d 471:
1

Plaintiffs' reference to this case is difficult to
understand.
Applicant sought to secure renewal of a general
license to carry on the same type of transportation
business that it h·ad carried on for several years past.
Competing carriers intervened, protesting the granting
of the license. The Commission deniec;I . the application, and applicant took an appeal. The. fourth syllabus
of the opinion is quite sufficient to show the sufficiency
of the facts established to justify_ the Court in affirming the judgment:
''Where motor vehicle, which had been operating for several years under special ip.ermit, had
not confined hauling to class of commodities which
it was licensed to haul, had failed to supply bond
or insurance contract required by Corporation
Commission, had failed to file required· tariff and
had offer~d no excuse for its conduct, Commission
did not act arbitrarily or abuse its discretion in
denying license to operate to carrier, notwithstanding that carrier had made rather heavy· in-vestments.''
If under the circumstances, the· Co!iporation ·Commission in the Arkansas case had- in fact granted the
licens-e, and the p.oin t had been raised that, in so doing,
it was guilty of an abuse of discretion, we would be
unable to see ·any escape :_from ~ holding by the Appellate ·Court that the point was wen· t~ken,
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Rowley vs. Public Service Commission, 112 Utah
11-6, 185 P. 2d 514:
Here .again it is difficult to understand why ~efer
ence to this case should be made by plaintiffs. The applicant filed an :application for a contract carrier permit,
to operate over all the highways of the State of Utah,
predicating his right to a permit on the so-called'' grandfather" clause ·Contained in the first 1paragraph of Section 76-5-21, Chapter 105, Laws of Utah 1945. The law
in question, among other things, provides that'' * • * The Commission shall grant on application to any applicant who was a contract motor
carrier as defined by this Act on the 1st day of
January, 1940, a permit to operate as a contract
motor carrier on the same highways and to carry
on .the s·ame type of motor service as he was on
said date. * * *"

The application was denied and .applicant appealed. The
operations on which applicant predicated his right to a
permit were found to be wholly ill~gal and this Court
affirmed the order of denial of the Commission. We
quote the following language, beginning -at the bottom
of page 128 of the Utah report, which language strongly
indicates, we venture to say, the evidence of sufficient
facts to justify a finding of wilful intent to violate the
law:

'' * • * Consider the operator who bad complied
with the law from March 15, 1933, to the 1st day
of January, 1940. His rights, if any, could rise
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no higher than those included in his original,per ..
mit. These permits, of course, require loading
and discharge points, and limits as to highways.
All highways were not available for his movements, and all cargo not movable by him. The
legal operator was restricted by the law, but lack
of detection ·apparently permitted the applicant
to roam the state at large. To permit the applicant to carry over all highways, and at the same
time to restrict legally operating carriers to designated routes would be to grant a premium for
illegality. We are convinced. the legislature never
intended such a result.''
In the instant proceeding, applicant did not ground

its application or right to a contract carrier permit- on
the grandfather clause, found in the legislative act of
1945 (first paragraph, Sec. 76-5-21, Chapter 105). Such_
reference as was made throughout the testimony at the
hearing before the Commission, to the fact that Leslie
Ashton and his three sons, as individuals, partnership~
or corporations, had, for a great many years prior to
the filing of the instant a;p.plication, transported :inerchandi,se for the Ashton Mercantile institutions in the
Uintah Basin, was done to show the needs, nature an..d
extent of the Ashton operations and also for the very
purpose of showing the absence of any wilful intent to
violate the law on the part of those receiving, as well
as those hauling, the merchandise. Applicant grounded
its application on the second paragraph of the section
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identified .above, requiring applicant to show four specified things :
1. That the highways over which applicant desires to operate ·are not unduly burdened.
· 2. That the granting of the application will not
unduly interfere with the travelling public.
3. That the granting of the a pp.Iica tion will not
be detrimental to the best interests of the
people of the State of Utah and/ or the localities to be served.
4. That the existing transportation facilities do
not provide adequate or reasonable service.
Each and all of these requirements, as well as the
absence of wilful intent to viol~ate the law; the Commis. sion found, had been met by applicant. And the evidence
on the question of lack of wilful intent, we submit, was
ample to justify the affirmative finding of the Commission and to negative any basis for the contention made
by counsel for plaintiffs that the Commission ~acted arbitrarily in granting a contract carrier permit to applicant.
Counsel for plaintiffs, after stating their belief that
there was no ~bowing of inadequacy or unreasonableness in the existing transportation facilities, nevertheless conceded that the facts of the instant proceeding
presented a "borderline case'', and recognized that a
case had been m~ade, but characterized it as ''very weak.''
From page 30 of their brief, we quote the following:
''In this case, plaintiffs believe there is no
.showing that existing facilities -are inadequate or
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unreasonable, and, certainly, the facts here present a borderline case. Under a correct understanding and application of the law, the .Commission acted arbitrarily in granting the certificate
applied for in the face of the wrongful operations
of the applicant, and the very weak case made on
adequacy and reasonableness.''
Both under the Utah statutes and decisions, if, on
the question of inadequacy and unreasonableness of
existing facilities, defendants made or pres-ented even a
borderline or a very we.ak case, still, we submit, the
action of the Commission, in granting applicant's rpermit,
must stand.
The scope of a review of an order or decision made
by the Public Service Commission is set forth in Section
76-6-16, Utah Code Annotated 1943, from which we quote
the following:

'' * • * The review shall not be extended further
than to determine whether the Commission has
regularly pursued its author~ty, including a determination of whether the order or decision
under review violates any right of the petitioner
·under the Constitution of the United States or
of the State of Utah. The findings and co_nclusions of the Commission on questions of fact
.shall be final, and ·shall.not be subject to review.
Such questions of f.act shall include ultima.te
facts and the fi.ndmgs and conclusions of the
Commission on reasonableness and discrimination. * • * ''
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This Court held, in Utah Light & Traction Co. v.
Public Service Commission, 101 U. 99, 118 P. 2d. '683,
that''The review by this Court, exerc1smg judicial
functions only, cannot extend beyond_ the questions as to whether the Commission acted within
its Constitutional and statutory powers, ·and
whether its determination and order is supported
by the evidence and is reasonable and not arbitrary.''
Also, in !-fulcahy v. Public Service Commission, 101
U. 245, 117 P. 2d 298, this Court held:
"It is not required that the facts found by the
Commission be conclusively established, nor even
that they be shown by a preponderance of the
evidence. If there is in the record competent
evidence from which a reasonable mind could believe ·or conclude that a certain fact existed, a
finding of such facts finds justification in the
evidence, and we cannot disturb it.''
The same doctrine was followed in Union Pacific R.
Co. v. Public Service Commission, 102 U. 465, 132 P. 2d
128.

---0--We submit that the evidence was sufficient to negative each of the three points advanced and relied upon
by plaintiffs in their .appeal from the order of the Commission granting the defendant, Ashton's, Inc., a permit
to operate, as a contract motor carrier of property for
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hire, from Salt Lake City, Utah, to Roosevelt and Vernal,
Utah, and also from Devil's Slide to Roosevelt and Vernal, Utah, serving Leslie Ashton & Sons Company at
}toosevelt, and Ashton Bros., Inc., and. Ashton Oil & Gas
Company at Vernal.
Respectfully submitted,
L. C. MONTGOMERY and
SKEEN,. THURMAN &
WORSLEY,
Attorneys for Defendant
( Resp,ondent),
Ashton's, Incorporated.
CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General,
and
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Defendant
(Resp1ondent),
Public Service Commission.

Dated August 31, 1950
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